We define the concept of a logic frame, which extends the concept of an abstract logic by adding the concept of a syntax and an axiom system. In a recursive logic frame the syntax and the set of axioms are recursively coded. A recursive logic frame is called recursively (countably) compact, if every recursive (respectively, countable) finitely consistent theory has a model. We show that for logic frames built from the cardinality quantifiers "there exists at least λ" recursive compactness always implies countable compactness. On the other hand we show that a recursively compact extension need not be countably compact.
Introduction
For the definition of an abstract logic and a generalized quantifier the reader is refereed to [2] , [8] , and [9] . Undoubtedly the most important among abstract logics are the ones that have a complete axiomatization of validity. In many cases, most notably when we combine even the simplest generalized quantifiers, completeness of an axiomatization cannot be proved in ZFC alone but depends of principles like CH or ♦. Our approach is look for ZFC-provable relationships between completeness, recursive compactness and countable compactness of a logic, that would reveal important features of the logic even if we cannot settle any one of these properties per se. For example, the countable compactness of the logic L(Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 , . . .) cannot be decided in ZFC, but we prove in ZFC that if this logic is recursively compact, it is countably compact. We show by example that recursive compactness does not in general imply countable compactness.
Examples of logics that have a complete axiomatization at least under additional set theoretic assumptions are:
• The infinitary language L ω 1 ω [6] .
• Logic with the generalized quantifier Q α xφ(x, y) ⇐⇒ |{x : φ(x, y)| ≥ ℵ α [16] .
• Logic with the Magidor-Malitz quantifier Q MM α xyφ(x, y, z) ⇐⇒ ∃X(|X| ≥ ℵ α ∧ ∀x, y ∈ Xφ(x, y, z)) [10] .
• Logic with the cofinality quantifier Q cof ℵ 0 xyφ(x, y, z) ⇐⇒ { x, y : φ(x, y, z)} has cofinality ℵ 0 [14] .
Logic Frames
Our concept of a logic frame captures the combination of syntax, semantics and proof theory of an extension of first order logic. This is a very general concept and is not defined here with mathematical exactness, as we do not prove any general results about logic frames. All our results are about concrete examples.
Definition 1 1. A logic frame is a triple
where (a) L, |= L is a logic in the sense of Definition 1.1.1 in [2] .
(b) A is a class of L * -axioms and L * -inference rules.
We write ⊢ A φ if φ is derivable using the axioms and rules in A.
where A κλ has as axioms the obvious axioms and Chang's Distributive Laws, and as rules Modus Ponens, Conjunction Rule, Generalization Rule and the Rule of Dependent Choices from [6] . This an old example of a logic frame introduced by Tarski in the late 50's and studied intensively, e.g. by Karp [6] .
where A Qα has as axioms the basic axioms of first order logic and
and Modus Ponens as the only rule. The logic L(Q α ) was introduced by Mostowski [11] and the above frame by Keisler [7] .
Example 4 Magidor-Malitz quantifier logic frame is
and A MM α is the set of axioms and rules introduced by Magidor and Malitz in [10] .
There is an effective algorithm which gives for each finite vocabulary τ the set L[τ ] and for each φ ∈ L[τ ] a second order formula 1 which defines the semantics of φ.
(b) There is an effective algorithm which gives the axioms and rules of A.
2.
A logic frame L * = L, |= L , A is a κ, λ -logic frame, if each sentence contains less than λ predicate, function and constant symbols, and |L[τ ]| ≤ κ whenever the vocabulary τ has less that λ symbols altogether.
2. recursively compact if every L * -theory which is recursive in the set of axioms and rules, and which has the property that every finite subset of it has a model, has itself a model.
3.
(κ, λ)-compact if every L * -theory of cardinality ≤ κ, every subset of cardinality < λ of which is A-consistent, has a model.
For recursive logic frames recursive compactness has a simpler definition: Every recursive theory, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model.
The logic frame L κλ is complete if 1. κ = µ + and µ <λ = µ, or 2. κ is strongly inaccessible, or 3. κ is weakly inaccessible, λ is regular and (∀α < κ)(∀β < λ)(α β < κ) [6] .
L κλ does not satisfy the completeness theorem if κ = λ is a successor cardinal (D.Scott, see [6] ). L κλ is not (κ, κ)-compact unless κ is weakly compact, and then also L κκ is (κ, κ)-compact. L κλ is not strongly compact unless κ is and then also L κκ is. If ℵ <ℵα α = ℵ α , then by Chang's Two-Cardinal Theorem, L(Q α+1 ) is complete and countably compact. If V=L, then L(Q α ) is complete and countably compact for all α. The logic frame L(Q MM α ) is complete, if we assume 3, 3 α and 3 α+1 , but there is a forcing extension in which L(Q MM 1 ) is not countably compact [1] .
Completeness, which can always be achieved by adding new axioms, does not imply recursive or countable compactness. However, if the axioms and rules have a "finite character", as is the case in first order logic, then the implication is true. Likewise, recursive compactness does not, a priori, imply countable compactness (see below for an example), although usually counterexamples to compactness in extensions of first order logic are very simple theories. This motivates the following definition:
3. recursive (κ, λ)-character if for every possible universe V ′ V ′ |= (L * is recursively compact ⇒ L * is (κ, λ)-compact).
Mere "character" means (ω, ω)-character. "Strong character", means (κ, ω)-character for all κ.
The definition of logic frames leaves many details vague, e.g. the exact form of axioms and rules. Also the conditions of a recursive logic frame would have to be formulated more exactly for any general results. Going into such details would take us too much astray from the main purpose of this paper.
Example 9
The logic frame L κλ is not of finite (κ, κ)-character, unless κ = ω, since it is in some possible universes complete, but not (κ, κ)-compact. The logic frames L(Q α ) and L(Q MM α ) are in some possible universes complete, but in some not countably compact. We discuss below the problem whether they have recursive or finite character.
A logic with recursive character
Let us consider the logic
where 0 < α 0 < α 1 < . . . are arbitrary ordinals. We cannot say in general whether L is countably compact or not. If CH holds, then L is countable compact [13] , but it is consistent that L(Q n+1 ) n<ω is not countably compact [12] . There is a natural axiom system A for L based on so called identities.
Using the methods of [13] it follows that if ℵ 0 is small for each ℵ αn (µ is small for λ if for every λ i , i < µ, we have i<µ λ i < λ), then this axiom system is complete and L is countably compact. In this section we show that if L is recursively compact, then L is countably compact. Thus L gives rise to an example of a logic frame with recursive character. The model theory of L is closely tied with the model theory of (ℵ αn ) n<ωlike models. This follows from usual reduction techniques (see [2, p. 45] ). We define now a generalized concept of identity needed for the formulation of the axioms of the logic L. The concept of identity was introduced in [13] (see also [2, p. 188 ] for a survey). A generalized identity is a sequence of finite equivalence relations on finite sets such that equivalent sets have the same size. In addition, the generalized identities are attached with a finite sequence of functions.
Definition 10
1. A generalized identity is a triple
where (a) Each D n is a finite set of ordinals,
(c) Each I n,a , a ∈ D n , is an equivalence relation on D <ω n , (d) xI n,a y implies |x| = |y| for all x and y, (e) h n : D <ω n → D n and n < m implies h n ⊆ h m .
Suppose
We say that I is a subidentity of I ′ , if there are a one-to-one σ : m → m ′ and an order-preserving π :
). If such bijections π and σ exist, then the generalized identities are called equivalent.
Let F be the class of all
4. If X ⊆ l<ω ω α l is finite, then F induces the generalized identity A priori, the elements of the domains D n of a generalized identity can be any ordinals, but up to equivalence, they can always be taken to be natural numbers. Thus, if we assume a canonical coding of such generalized identities by natural numbers, it makes sense to ask whether a certain set of identities is recursive or not. Also, I <ω (F ) = I(F ) up to equivalence.
Definition 11 Suppose α n , n < ω are ordinals in increasing order. An (ℵ αn ) n<ω -like model is a model A in a language with distinguished predicates P n , n < ω, and a binary predicate < such that for all n P A n , < A is ℵ αn -like, i.e. a linear order of cardinality ℵ αn and every initial segment is of cardinality < ℵ αn .
The definition of a generalized identity looks complicated but its meaning becomes completely transparent when one realizes that it is exactly what one needs to construct by means of Skolem functions and the Compactness Theorem an (ℵ αn ) n<ω -like model for a first order theory.
Proof. This is like [13] . Suppose F = (F l,α ) l<ω,α<ωα l , (h l ) l<ω is a fundamental function for α. Suppose T is a finitely consistent L(Q αn ) n<ω theory. W.l.o.g. T has built-in Skolem functions, the language of T includes unary predicates P l , l < ω, and a binary predicate <, and it suffices to construct a ( ℵ α l ) l<ω -like model for T . Let T * consist of T plus the axioms
. . , c l ηn )) for all terms t and (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ) ∈ (ℵ α l ) n such that F l,α (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ) = F l,α (η 1 , . . . , η n )
It is easy to see that the Skolem closure of the constants is ( ℵ α l ) l<ω -like in every model of T * . Thus it suffices to show that T * is finitely consistent. We refer to the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 in [2, Chapter V] for details. 2
A consequence of the above proof is:
Corollary 13 There is a set Ax(α) of valid sentences of L(Q αn ) n<ω such that if there is a fundamental function for α, then a sentence φ of L(Q αn ) n<ω is valid if and only if it follows from Ax(α) and the axiom schemas of first order logic using rules of proof of first order logic. If I(α) is r.e., then so is Ax(α).
The axiomatization Ax(α) may not be complete, but the point is, that if there is a fundamental function for α, then it is complete. So we know the axiomatization, but we do not always have a fundamental function. Likewise, we do not know in general whether I(α) is r.e. but if it is, then Ax(α) gives a recursive complete axiomatization of L(Q αn ) n<ω . Thus the triple
forms a logic frame, which is a recursive logic frame if I(α) is r.e. and complete if there is a fundamental function for α.
Lemma 14 Suppose α = α n : n < ω is a sequence of ordinals in increasing order. Suppose I is a generalized identity. There is a sentence φ I in L(Q αn ) n<ω such that the following conditions are equivalent:
1. φ I has a model.
I / ∈ I(α)
Proof. Suppose I = (D n ) n<m , (I n,a ) n<m,a∈Dn , (h n ) n<m . The vocabulary of φ n,I has a unary predicate P l , a binary predicate < and an i-ary function symbol F i l,a for each l < m, a ∈ D l and i < n = | j<m D j |. Let φ − I be the conjunction of Proof. If there is a fundamental function for α, then L(Q αn ) n<ω is countably compact by Proposition 12. Thus we may assume that there is no fundamental function for α. Let J = {I n : n < ω} be a canonical enumeration of all I / ∈ I(α). Let T be the L(Q αn ) n<ω -theory consisting of 1. "c has at least n predecessors in <", for n < ω, 2. "If c has at least n predecessors in <, then σ In ".
The theory T is recursive in J , and finitely consistent by Lemma 16. On the other hand, any model of T would give rise to a fundamental function for α by Lemma 15. 2
A logic which does not have recursive character
We show that there is a logic frame L * which is recursively compact but not countably compact. We make use of the quantifier Q St from [14] . To recall the definition of Q St we adopt the following notation: It follows from [15] and [3] that L(Q St ) equipped with some natural axioms and rules is a complete countably compact logic frame.
Definition 20 If S ⊆ ω 1 , then the generalized quantifier Q St S is defined by
The syntax of the logic L St is defined as follows: L St extends first order logic by the quantifiers Q 1 , Q St and the infinite number of new formal quantifiers Q St Xn (we leave X n unspecified).
If we fix a sequence S 0 , S 1 , ... and let Q St Xn be interpreted as Q St Sn , we get a definition of semantics of L St . We call this semantics the S 0 , S 1 , ...
Definition 21 We call a finite sequence σ = S 0 , S 1 , ..., S n (or an infinite sequence S 0 , S 1 , ... ) of subsets of ω 1 stationary independent, if all finite Boolean combinations of the sets S i are stationary.
We will show now that the set of valid sentences of L St is independent of the sequence S 0 , S 1 , ..., as long as this sequence is stationary independent.
Rather than giving an explicit axiom system for L St we manipulate models of set theory in order to get the same results. Throughout, we use ZFC 0 to denote a finite fragment of ZFC sufficient for the arguments involved. This is only to guarantee the existence of models. We make extensive use of the following result of Hutchinson: As pointed out in [5, Theorem 3.5], Lemma 1 can be iterated ω 1 times to get an elementary extension N of M such that ω N 1 , ǫ N is an ℵ 1 -like linear order with a filtration C α : α < ω 1 such that C α ∈ N and {α : N |= "C α has a sup in S"} is a club subset of ω 1 . In the proof of [2, Theorem 3.2.2] this idea is elaborated by splitting ω 1 first into ℵ 1 disjoint stationary sets and then extending all possible stationary sets, one at a time. This yields an elementary extension N of M such that (G) ω N 1 , ǫ N is an ℵ 1 -like linear order with a filtration C α : α < ω 1 such that each C α is in N and if N |= "S ⊆ ω 1 is stationary", then {α : N |= "C α has a sup in S"} is a stationary subset of ω 1 .
Let us call a model M of set theory good, if it satisfies (G). We have sketched a proof of:
Lemma 2 Every countable model M of ZF C has a good elementary extension of cardinality ℵ 1 .
With a minor modification we get:
Lemma 3 Suppose M is a countable model of ZFC 0 and σ ∈ M such that M |= "σ = S 0 , S 1 , ... is stationary independent." Suppose T 0 , T 1 , ..., T n is an arbitrary stationary independent sequence. Then there is a good elementary extension N of M such that ω N 1 , ǫ N is an ℵ 1 -like linear order with a filtration C α : α < ω 1 and a club D such that for all α < ω 1 C α ∈ N and for all i = 0, ..., n and all α ∈ D we have N |= "C α has a sup in S i " ⇐⇒ α ∈ T i . Proof. One can imitate the proof in [5, Theorem 3.5] and the proof of [2, Theorem 3.2.2]. W.l.o.g., the sets in S 0 , S 1 , ..., S n partition ω 1 in M and the same holds for T 0 , T 1 , ..., T n . In the iteration of Lemma 1 we extend at stage ξ the set S i if ξ ∈ T i . 2 Proposition 4 Suppose φ is a sentence of L St . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. φ has a model in some S 0 , S 1 , ... -interpretation, where S 0 , S 1 , ... is stationary independent.
2. φ has a model in all S 0 , S 1 , ... -interpretations, for S 0 , S 1 , ... stationary independent.
Proof. Suppose φ ∈ L St . Choose n ∈ ω such that φ contains no quantifiers Q St X i for i > n. Let Φ(A, σ, φ) be a formula of set theory expressing the conjunction of "A |= φ in the σ-interpretation" and "σ = S 0 , S 1 , ..., S n is stationary independent" in such a way that if M is a good model of ZFC 0 containing A and σ, then the following conditions are equivalent:
The claim follows now from Lemma 3. 2 Proof. Suppose φ ∈ L St . Let Φ be as in the proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma 3 we have the equivalence of
Since the latter is a Π 0 1 -property of φ, we have proved the claim. The axioms of L St (S 0 , S 1 , ...) state the stationary independence of S 0 , S 1 , ... . Thus the completeness of L St (S 0 , S 1 , ...) is vacuous for stationary nonindependent S 0 , S 1 , ... . The same method gives the following partial countable compactness result: Suppose S 0 , S 1 , ... is stationary independent. Any finitely consistent countable theory in L St , which contains an occurrence of Q St Xn for only finitely many n, has a model. Note that the syntax and the axioms of L St (S 0 , S 1 , ...) are independent of S 0 , S 1 , ... . We conjecture that there is a natural complete axiom system for all L St (S 0 , S 1 , ...) based on
• The usual axioms and rules of L(Q 1 ) as in [7] .
• Natural axioms (like Fodor's Lemma) for Q St as in [3] .
• Axiom schemas stating the stationary independence of S 0 , S 1 , ... . Proof. It suffices to notice that if M is ω-standard in Lemma 1, then so is N. 2
Let L
By making different choices for the stationary independent S 0 , S 1 , ... , we can get logics with different properties. We illustrate this now by making a choice of S 0 , S 1 , ... which will render L St (S 0 , S 1 , ...) recursively compact but not countably compact.
Let us fix a countable vocabulary τ which contains infinitely many symbols of all arities. Let T n , n < ω, list all Ax(L St )-consistent recursive L Sttheories in the vocabulary τ . Let τ n be a new disjoint copy of τ for each n < ω. Let τ * consist of the union of all the τ n , the new binary predicate symbol < * , and new unary predicate symbols P n for n < ω. If φ is a formula and d ∈ 2, let (φ) d be φ, if d = 0, and ¬φ, if d = 1. If S ⊆ ω 1 , then (S) d is defined similarly. For any η : ω → 2 let ψ η ∈ L St ω 1 ω be the conjunction of the following sentences of the vocabulary τ * :
(a) T n translated into the vocabulary τ n .
(b) < * is an ℵ 1 -like linear order of the universe.
(c) Q St
Xn xy(x < * y ∧ P n (x) ∧ P n (y)). (d) ¬∃x n (P n (x)) η(n) .
Lemma 11 There is η : ω → 2 such that ψ η has a model. Thus V [η] satisfies the Σ 1 -sentence ∃η(ψ η has a model).
(1)
By the Levy-Shoenfield Absoluteness Lemma and Proposition 10 there is η in V such that (1) holds in V . 2
Now let S * 0 , S * 1 , ... be stationary independent such that ψ η has a model M * in the S * 0 , S * 1 , ... -interpretation.
Theorem 22 The recursive logic frame L St (S * 0 , S * 1 , ...) is recursively compact but not countably compact.
Proof. Suppose T is a consistent recursive theory in L St . W.l.o.g. T = T m for some m < ω. Thus M * ↾ τ n gives immediately a model of T . To prove that L St is not countably compact, let T be a theory consisting of the following sentences:
(ii) Q St S * n xy(x < * y ∧ P n (x) ∧ P n (y)) for n < ω. (iii) Q St xy(x < * y ∧ P (x) ∧ P (y)).
(iv) ∀x(P (x) → (P n (x)) η(n) ) for n < ω.
Any finite subtheory of T contains only predicates P 0 , ..., P m for some m, and has therefore a model: we let P i = S * i for i = 0, ..., m and P = (P 0 ) η(0) ∩ ... ∩ (P m ) η(m) .
On the other hand, suppose A, < * , P, P 0 , P 1 , ... |= T . By (ii) there are filtrations D n α : α < ω 1 of < * and clubs E n such that for all n and for all α ∈ E n {α < ω 1 : D n α has a sup in A, < * } = S * n . By (iii) there is a filtration F α : α < ω 1 of < * such that B = {α < ω 1 : F α has a sup in P } is stationary. Let E * ⊆ n E n be a club such that C α = D n α = F α for α ∈ E * and n < ω. Let δ ∈ E * ∩ B and a = sup F δ . Then a ∈ P . Hence a ∈ n (P n ) η(n) by (iv). As a = sup D n δ for all n, we have a ∈ n (S * n ) η(n) , contrary to the choice of η. We have proved that theory T has no models. 2 Thus L St does not have finite character. We end with an example of a logic which, without being provably complete, has anyhow finite character:
Recall that ♦ S for S ⊆ ω 1 is the statement that there are sets A α ⊆ α, α ∈ S, such that for any X ⊆ ω 1 , the set {α ∈ S : X ∩ α = A α } is stationary. We get a recursive logic frame L ♦ = L ♦ , |=, A by adapting the set Ax(L St ) to the case of just one bistationary set.
Theorem 13 L ♦ has finite character.
Proof. Suppose there is no bistationary S with ♦ S . Then the consistent sentence "< is an ℵ 1 -like linear order ∧ Q St xy(x < y) ∧ Q St S ♦ (x < y)" has no model, so L is incomplete. Suppose there is a bistationary S with ♦ S but no maximal one. Then the consistent sentence "< is an ℵ 1 -like linear order ∧ Q St xy(x < y ∧ P (x)) ∧ Q St S ♦ (x < y ∧ ¬P (x))" has no model, so L is again incomplete. Finally, suppose there is a maximal bistationary S with ♦ S . Now L is countably compact by the remark right after Corollary 9. 2
Our results obviously do not aim to be optimal. We merely want to indicate that the concept of a logic frame offers a way out of the plethora of independence results about generalized quantifiers. The logic L(Q n+1 ) n<ω is a good example. The results about its countable compactness under CH and countable incompactness in another model of set theory leave us perplexed about the nature of the logic. Having recursive character reveals something conclusive and positive, and raises the question, do other problematic logics also have recursive character. Our logic L St is the other extreme: it is always completely axiomatizable, but a judicious choice of S 0 , S 1 , ... renders it recursively compact without being countably compact.
Open Question: Does the Magidor-Malitz logic L(Q MM 1 ) have recursive character?
